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In the Supre111e Court
of the State of Utah
LA \VRENCE H. STRATFORD and
ELLA L. STRATFORD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No. 9198

<;I~~ORGE

G. WOOD and LEAH: C.
WOOD, his wife,
Defendan,ts and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEI\1ENT OF rrHE CASE
r:rhis suit was brought by Lawrence I-!. Stratford and
l~lla L. Stratford, Respondents, to quiet title to Lots 11,
12 and 13, Block 5, The Groves, in Emigration ·Canyon,
together with damages for trespass by defendants on
plaintiffs' lands.
There was no dispute as to the fact that plaintiffs are
and at all times material to this action were the owners
of Lots 11, 12 and 13, Block 5, The Groves, but the question in issue is, where on the ground is the South line of
Lot 11, owned by plaintiffs, which is the North line of Lot
10, owned by defendants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Defendants answered setting up that they were entitled to the property heretofore occupied by them by
right of adverse possession, but failed to adduce evidence
sufficient to support this defense.
Plaintiffs first employed :Mr. Robert A. Wilkins to
survey the lots. Subsequently plaintiffs employed Bush
and Gudgell to survey the lots. The Survey of Bush and
Gudgell found the line dividing Lots 10 and 11 to be approximately 17 feet south of the dividing line as found
by Mr. Wilkins. Defendants contended for the line as established by Mr. Wilkins, and plaintiffs for the line established by Bush and Gudgell.
The case was sub1nitted to the jury on two Interrogatories:
1. Which survey, the Wilkins or Gudgell survey,
correctly shows the true boundary line between
the land of plaintiffs and defendants.
2.

The amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs
as a result of the use of plaintiffs' land by defendants.

The jury found that the Gudgell survey was correct and
that plaintiffs are entitled to damages in the amount of
$295.00.
In order to pass upon the errors which Appellants
assert were committed by the Trial Court, it is necessary
to direct the attention of the Court to the evidence offered
and received at the trial. This we shall do.
George B. Gudgell was first called and testified in
substance as follows: That he is a Consuting Civil Engin-
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and Land Surveyor and ha~ been engaged in surveying for about sixteen years. They surveyed Lots 11, 12
and 13 in Block G of Groves Subdivision. (R. 13) He
followed the official plat of rrhe Groves Subdivision. (Exhibit ·1) (R. 13) His men found the section corner which
was identified by two blazed trees and located the two
county monurnents. He verified the correctness of the
section corner with the two county monuments. (R. 15)
He stated that:
"vVe used our traverse down frmn the section
corner, then went up and tied it to the plaintiffs'
property and staked out or put his corner stakes
in directly frorn the section corner." (R. 16)
~xhibit

1 is a plat reflecting the location of these
corners and it correctly reflects the location of the improvements, buildings, picnic areas and such as they are
located on the land in relation to that corner. They tied
in several fences as they went up the canyon.
On cross examination :Mr. Gudgell was asked whether
or not he did the surveying himself. He stated that the
original survey he did not do himself, but when he found
out the n1atter was going to court, he went up and checked
the survey. He started at the county n1onuments. His
men checked into ~he county 1nonu1nents and checked the
corner n1onuments, so he started on those monuments.
He did not start from the section corner himself. He did
not show all the courses with all the distances set out on
the map that he introduced first. (Exhibit 3) He ran a
traverse line of his own up there. (R. 17) They calculated
their traverse and calculated the corners, but they did
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not run the courses of each angle and each distance set
out on the map which had been introduced as Exhibit 4.
He ran the courses and distances at the office, but not on
the ground. (R. 18) They checked some of the fence lines
on some of the lots as they went up for the purpose of
determining whether or not the angles and distances set
out in Exhibit 4 were correct. Surveyors and Engineers
place great confidence in old established fence lines which
show the angles and distances in various lots. (R. 18) He
was asked to assume that there is more land in the area
than is shown on the map Exhibit 4, and was asked
whether the lots might fit going up, but coming down they
might not fit. He stated that the Subdivision is tied to
the one section corner only, and that is what he had to
survey from. He checks fence lines and angles on lots to
confirm the fact that the lot is correctly platted. (R.19)
He was asked the following question and gave the following answer:
Q. "You do check your p.i.'s (point of intersection and your fence lines to determine
whether or not the lots are correctly platted
or correctly located on your plat, don't you~
A.

"We check those to tell whether our lots are
correctly-what we do is tie in with those
things to see if as we go up there we have
something to substantiate our survey. That is
the reason for it."
·

If, upon such a check, a fence line which has been established for twenty or thirty or forty years was twenty or
thirty feet out, it would immediately raise the question as
to whether or not the survey was correct. (R. 20)
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On redirect exmnination .Mr. Gudgell testified that if
he found a fence line substantially out, he would not
change his survey according to the fence. He surveyed
according to the deed description. (R. 20) He ran the
survey line himself with two other rnen. (R. 21) He
checked the fence or corner of Lot 2. His stake was west,
or rather, south of the fence line about two feet at that
point. (R. 21-22)
On recross exarnination .Mr. Gudgell testified that he
ran a traverse on each of the pieces of property from the
starting point up to the Wood property, but a traverse
is not run on each piece of property. (R. 23)
On redirect examination he testified that running
a traverse is the standard and customary manner of surveying as against running each individual property line.
That they usually traverse the easiest line and then calculate where they are and calculate where the corners are
when they get up close to the property and put the corners
in frmn that. It is possible to achieve an accurate property line in running a traverse in that manner. (R. 24)
.Mr. Robert John Ketchurn wa8 then sworn and testified: That he is Vice-President of the Ketchum Builders
Supply Company. (R. 27) If the sleeping cabin were
removed, he could probably sell the same for $600.00, and
the cost of rnoving it would probably be $400.00, leaving
them a profit of $200.00. (R. 30)
~Ir.

Gordon C. Holt was then sworn and testified:
That he is a Real Estate Broker and has been for about
twenty years and is experienced in appraising property.
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(R. 33-34) In the last five years he has had transactions
involving two properties in Emigration Canyon and is
familiar with the lots and values in Emigration Canyon.
It is his opinion that Lot 11 has a value of $2500.00. He
has had experience in leasing property. The rental value
of property is usually based upon a capitalization of the
value of the property. (R. 35) That a fair rental value
of Lot 11 would be $21.00 a month. (R. 36)
On cross examination he stated he could not tell of
any sale in the area within the last five years of a 100-foot
piece of property for $2500.00. (R. 37) He does not know
of any rentals of vacant property ever having been made
in Emigration Canyon. (R. 38)
In answer to a question of the Court as to whether
the witness thought that in the vicinity of the cabins on
the property in question a vacant lot could be rented for
any price for a short term, he stated he did not know.
(R. 43) The Court stated he supposed that vacant sites
in the canyon were of use to the public generally only
when a cabin is built on it, to which witness answered
"Yes". The Court asked him if he knew of any other
use made of the sites, and he answered "No, sir." (R. 44)
Plaintiff Ella L. Stratford was then called and testified as follows: That she is one of the owners of Lots
11, ·12 and 13. The sleeping cabin on Lot 11 was erected
in May or June, 1954, by defendant George Wood. (R. 45)
In June of 1954 she and her husband and Mr. Wood had
a conversation. Mr. Wood said, "I guess I have built on
some of your land." (R. 46) Her husband asked why he
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had done ~o. and he 1::\tated he didn't think that they \vould
care. llPr husband told _Mr. \Vood to get the cabin off the
land. ( R. -1: I) She told l\1r. \rood that if he didn't move
his cabin, they would have it surveyed. (R. 48) vVhen
asked on other occasions concerning the matter, Mr.
\Vood would never give a definite answer, except to say
"\VItere is your line?'' She couldn't say. She had conversations with Mrs. Wood, but :Mrs. Wood would make no
comment other than to say she would talk with her husband and see what he says. (R. 48-49)
On cross exa1nination she stated she told 1\Ir. Wood
that the whole area involved in the suit was their land;
that about 25 or 30 years ago they had had the land surveyed, but she couldn't tell where the surveyor fixed the
line. (R. 50) The only tin1e that she talked about any
survey or stakes with 1\{r. Wood was in 1954 when she
asked Mr. Wood to remove the cabin from her land. (R.
51)
_Mr. Lawrence H. Stratford was then called and testified: He is one of the plaintiffs in the action and one of
the owners of Lots 11, 12 and 13. The sleeping cabin was
erected in the forepart of June, 1954, by Mr. Wood. (R.
51) In the forepart of June, 1954, he, l\1rs. Stratford and
Mr. \Vood had a conversation. At that time Mr. Wood
was just finishing the cabin. vVhen the conversation first
started nlr. Wood said, "Strat, I guess I built on your
property, but I didn't think you would care." He told Mr.
\Yood that he wanted him to get off the property. Mr.
\Vood stated that he wouldn't know where the line was,
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and Mr. Stratford asked him why he didn't get it surveyed. (R. 52) Witness stated that he had had two surveys of the property made, one by Mr. Wilkins and the
second by Bush & Gudgell. He paid Mr. Wilkins $205.34
for making the survey and gave a check to Bush and Gudgell for $480.00 for the later survey. The two checks
were introduced into evidence as Exhibits 8 and 9. (R. 53)
Objection was made to the introduction of the checks for
any purpose other than to fix the date thereon, on the
ground that the same were immaterial. The Court overruled the objections. (R. 54) Mr. Stratford stated that
neither he nor his family ever used the sleeping cabin nor
had they used the picnic area. (R. 54)
Plaintiff rested.
Mr. Robert A. Wilkins was then called to testify. He
stated he was 72 years of age. He has been engaged in
engineering since 1913 and as a licensed engineer and
survyor. (R. 56) He has been a surveyor since 1915, and
was qualified in the mining business and became a United
States Mineral Surveyor and practiced the patenting of
mining claims for eight years in the Tintic Mining District. In August or September, 1956, at the request of
Mr. Stratford he surveyed Lots 10, 11, 12 and 13, and that
he recently rechecked the survey of those lots to determine where the south line of Mr. Stratford's property is.
At the request of Mr. Wood he rechecked his survey
made for Mr. Stratford and went carefully over all of the
deeds and the abstract from the beginning of the survey,
The (troves, taking the courses and distances on each side
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ol' the lane, which is called Burr's Lane. (R. 57) Witness
wa~ n~kPd the following question and gave the following
answer:
Q. "Did I understand yon correcty to say that
von started down at the south end and went
~lp the courses and distances of each course
and distance until you got up to the property
that belonged to Mr. Stratford~"
A.

"I did, and I didn't only take one side. I took
both sides because the courses and distances
are different on the turning point and in that
way I was able to see how these lots fit in.
If you study this map you will see that the
pattern is definite and all the way up there
and there are so Inany lots that have to be put
in between these turning points, and even if
you were just a careful observer you will get
on to that pattern and you cannot go very far
wrong." (R. 58-59)

He stated that he determined where the south line of Mr.
Stratford's property is following the courses and distances and drove an iron pipe to mark the point. (R. 59)
That the sleeping cabin is 10.7 feet from a line drawn
from the peg fixed by the witness as being on the south
line of the Stratford property. (R. 60) He has checked
against the courses and distances with the monuments
that are on the side of the road, that is, fences and other
monuments. (R. 61)
He identified Exhibit D 13 as a map made for Mr.
Stratford. (R. 62) He found that there was more ground
than the lots called for. (R. 63) He started at the south
end and measured each distance and each course up the
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whole area up to the Stratford property trying to fit in
the various lots that are shown on the map, Exhibit D13.
(R. 64) He measured the distance between his line and
the line that was fixed by the stakes of Bush & Gudgell,
and it was a distance of about 19 feet. (R. 64) The line
as fixed by him ran 10.8 feet from the sleeping cabin.
(R. 65) The Bush & Gudgell line is 19 feet south of the
line drawn by the witness. (R. 66)
On cross examination Mr. Wilkins testified: He used
the southeast corner of Lot 13 as the starting point for
the beginning of his survey. (R. 70) That there was a
monument at the intersection of the fences on Lot 13. The
fence is still there, it is well identified with a 2x2x10
foot high monument. In making the survey in 1937 he
located a sandstone monument, but when he made his
survey for Mr. Stratford in 1956 he did not find the sandstone monument. He used the same beginning point because the fence was still in place. (R. 71) He had started
from the point, which, from his recollection, was the location on which the sandstone monument had been, and it
is his belief and his understanding that that was the best
possible point because it was right on the eompany
ground and their own fence and the beginning of private
lots. (R. 72) He saw but did not use the section corner.
The county monuments did not have a bearing on the survey. (R. 72) He did not attempt in 1956 to locate the section corner. He took the line of the fence near the starting point and went into the lot a certain distance and then
turned the angle to the call of the Deed. He ran traverse
lines. He turned his angle from the compass and then
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checked fro1n the backside of the con1pass to check that he
wa~ correct. (R. 75) He always reads the c01npass as a
check with the horizontal angle, and he read the vertical
angle for distances. In 1naking this survey he was going
up a hill. (R. 77) He told Mr. Gudgell and Mr. Brayton
and Counsel for plaintiff that he turned his angles with
the c01npass and checked it by taking the reverse side of
the compass. That is a check he always uses. He read the
horizontal angle each time. lie set up points and turned
the angle, then read the cmnpass to see that an error
could not creep in. In setting his beginning course he
used the course of the fence on Lot 13. (R. 78) The road
leaves Burr's Lane as it is platted in many instances. It
is crowded over to the east side. (R. 81) He had run a
traverse line in getting up to the property. It is standard
practice for surveyors to run a traverse line. (R. 82)
:Mr. George G. Wood was then called and testified:
He is one of the defendants in the action. (R. 84) He
moved on to the property in 1943. The area between his
cabin and the bunk house consists of two patios. Most
of the rock work on the patios had been built in the 20's.
At one time there was lawn put in, but it wouldn't grow,
so shale was put on the area. Mr. Whitney sank his septic
tank right beneath the east patio. The west patio is
about fifteen feet long and about ten feet wide. Mr. Whitney had put cement on that and built up walls on the side.
It was built in 1924. The boy's initials are still there in
the cement. Just north of the lower patio Mr. Whitney
has a little shack which is used for a tool shed now, but
which used to house an electrical generator which gener-
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a ted electricity for his house. (R. 85) The shed was located where the bunk house is now located. The shed was
moved over to make way for the bunk house. There has
been no enlargement of the patios since witness moved in
in 1943. On the upper patio witness had put a table and
some stools around the table which seat seventeen people.
The table is round and built of cement. The hunk house
was built in 1956 or 1954. (R. 86) Mr. Stratford said that
he thought the bunk house had been built on his (Stratoord's) property, and to move it off. Witness stated he
did not recall saying that he guessed he had built on
Stratford's land. (R. 87) Mrs. Stratford stated that the
bunk house was on her property. He measured from the
upper line or big gate on Mr. Stratford's property 100
feet south. So measuring, Mr. Stratford's south line
would be north of the bunk house about eighteen to twenty
feet! (R. 88) The land immediately north of the bunk
house dips down into a little creek that drains plaintiffs'
spring. (R. 89)
On cross examination Mr. Wood stated he did not
have a survey made before building the bunk house. He
had recently had a survey made by Mr. Wilkins. (R. 89)
Also that he had had l\!Ir. Arnold Coon survey the property. That the line fixed by Mr. Coon was "pretty close
to the line fixed by Mr. Gudgell, about two inches different." He went out with Mr. Coon when he found the section corner. He didn't make a survey from the section
corner down. He started from the county monuments
and he checked out within two inches of the line shown on
plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. (R. 90) Mr. Coon did not follow each
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as .Mr. Wilkins did. lie had not had 1\lr. Coon
elteek with the vVilkins' survey to find out if there was
anything wrong with it. (R. 91) The sleeping cabin is
about twenty feet long. (R. 93) In Ineasuring the Stratford propcrt~T' witness started at the edge of the road
where .Mr. Stratford's gate is Ineasured down 100 feet.
(H. ~)[>) .Mr. Whitney did not ever show him a property
line. The cabin on the \Voods' property was built in 1909
b~· .Mr. Whitney, and :Mr. Whitney told him the south
line was about two or three feet south of the cabin. Mr.
\Vhitney told him he had put his septic tank under the
patio. He found the tank north of the house. Until the
lawsuit caine up, witness had no idea where the property
line was and no one has ever told him. (R. 100)

<·ounH·

Defendants rested.
Plaintiffs recalled :Mr. Gudgell who testified as follows: He heard Nir. Wilkins testify that he made the beginning point of his survey at what he thought had formerly been a location of a standstone monument. The
witness surveyed that monu1nent and tied in to the fence
line from which Mr. Wilkins started. His calculation was
within three feet of the line found by J\t1r. Wilkins. (R.
103) The use of a transit gives a closer check on an angle
than just using the compass and if there is any Inetal
close to the compass or a car parked close to the -transit
when it is set up, it can vary the needle quite a bit. (R.
106) A metal pencil in the surveyor's pocket may make
a difference of three or four degrees. If there is error
in turning an angle, it will throw off the findings in reach-
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ing a point. (R.107) Such an error in going north would
have a tendency to throw the survey off more east and
west than north and south. (R. 108)
Arnold W. Coon was then sworn and testified in rebuttal for plaintiffs. He is a licensed engineer and land
surveyor. He was asked to check the survey made by
Mr. GudgelL In the interest of economy, he suggested
getting together with Mr. Gudgell and checking the calcu~
lations that he had made and to go up on the site with
the man who had done the actual field work for Bush &
Gudgell and check his procedures and then give an independent opinion as to whether he thought the method
and mathematics they had used were valid or not.
On objection of counsel for defendants that the witness' testimony was not rebuttal, the Court sustained the
objection as to any computation which Mr. Gudgell had
made, but stated that he could testify as to anything that
he had checked on Mr. Wilkins' work.
The witness stated that he was later retained to go
up with instruments and courses and determine the location of Bush & Gudgell's point in respect to the Wilkins'
point. (R. 111) He tied them in and found that there
was a difference of 17.2 feet north and south between the
two surveys. (R. 112-113) The witness was asked the
following questions and gave the following answer:
Q.

"Have you made any independent check of the
procedures made by or taken by Mr. Wilkins 1
Do you know what procedures he followed~"

A.

"No. The only thing I had was a copy of a
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map that he had drawn of that area, but I
have never talked to 1\fr. Wilkins, and anything that I have concerning his procedures
or n1ethods or calculations would be strictly
hearsay."
rrhe witness was then asked the following question:
Q.

"Based upon your own calculations of the location of that corner, is it your opinion that
the Wilkins' location of that corner is correct
or incorrect~"

'ro which the same objection was made. The Court then
stated that he could answer whether in his opinion the
\Vilkins' survey was incorrect. He answered "Yes, our
survey would indicate that the Wilkins' survey is incorrect."
On cross exmnination the witness stated that he used
the county monuments that are in existence on the
grounds as a starting point and ran a complete and independent survey so that he had the information concerning
Gudgell's traverse, but he did not run the courses along
Burr Avenue. In answer to question by the Court as to
·why he did not run the courses along Burr A venue, he
stated that it would necessitate cutting down trees to
make such a survey. The Court asked him if he got on to
a line so that he could see whether there were any trees
in his way, to which he answered, "No." (R.l16)
.Mr. Edwin Whitney was called to testify on behalf
of the plaintiff, but at the conclusion of his testimony,
the Court ordered all of his testimony stricken.
Both parties then rested.
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The Court orally instructed the jury and counsel
argued the case to the jury. Counsel for the defendants
in arguing the matter, attempted to argue that the fact
that the area between the Gudgell survey line and the
Wilkins survey line had been occupied in connection with
the Wood property for 35 years and had been occupied
by Mr. Wood from 1943 to the time of commencing the action without question, was evidence that the Wilkins survey was correct. On objection of counsel for the plaintiff, the Court refused to permit counsel for the defendant
to discuss such evidence, which ruling counsel assigned
as prejudicial error.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellants argue this appeal on the following points:
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS TO ARGUE THAT THE FACT
THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE GUDGELL SURVEY
LINE AND THE WILKINS SURVEY LINE HAD BEEN USED
AND OCCUPIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WOOD
PROPERTY FOR 35 YEARS AND BY DEFENDANTS FROM
1943 UNTIL 1954 WITHOUT QUESTION, WAS EVIDENCE
THA'T THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS CORRECT. (R. 138-140)
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE WITNESS
COON, OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL, TO STATE
HIS OPINION THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS INCORRECT. (R. 114)
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POINT THREE
THE ·COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.
THIRTEEN AND EACH SUBDIVISION THEREOF.

ARGUl\1ENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS TO ARGUE THAT THE FACT
THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE GUDGELL SURVEY
LINE AND THE WILKINS SURVEY LINE HAD BEEN USED
AND OCCUPIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WOOD
PROPERTY FOR 35 YEARS AND BY DEFENDANTS FROM
1943 UNTIL 1954 WITHOUT QUESTION, WAS EVIDENCE
THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS CORRECT. (R. 138-140)

The 1nain issue in this case is whether the boundary
line fixed by Wilkins or the line fixed by Gudgell is correct. The \V ood property, Lot 10, lies south of the Stratford property, Lots 11, 12 and 13. The Gudgellline runs
east and west a few feet north of the Wood cabin which
was built in 1909. The Wilkins' line parallels the Gudgell
line and is 17.2 feet north of the Gudgell line. (R.112)
The sleeping cabin built by 1fr. Wood in 1954 is 10.7 feet
north of the Wilkins boundary line. (R. 60) The area
between the two survey lines was used by Mr. Whitney,
.Jir. \Vood's predecessor in title, during the 1920's and
1930's. He built two patios of cement with walls in the
area behveen the two survey lines, and put his septic tank
first beneath the east patio. l\1r. Whitney deeded to Mr.
Stevenson in January, 1941. (Ex. P-10) Mr. Stevenson
deeded to I\1r. \Vood in August, 1943. (Ex. P-12) Mr.
\Y ood built a round table on the westerly of the two
patios, built a lazy susan on the table and stools for seven-
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teen people around the table. (R. 86) This patio is fifteen
feet long and ten feet wide. The area between the two
survey lines is indispensible to whoever uses the Wood
cabin. The occupants of the Wood cabin have always used
the area north to the general area of the Wilkins line.
Mrs. Stratford testified that 25 or 30 years ago they
had the property surveyed. No question of the use of the
area north of the Wood's cabin to the Wilkins line was
ever raised by the Stratfords. It was not until Mr. Wood
built the sleeping cabin 10.7 feet north of the Wilkins
line in 1954 that the Stratfords complained that he was on
their property. Then as Mrs. Stratford testified, "He
was told to get the cabin off the land." (R. 47) She also
testified she told Mrs. 1Nood that the sleeping cabin was
on "our" (Stratford) property, and "they wanted it off.''
(R. 48) She further testified:
"The only time I talked about any survey or
stakes was in 1954 when I asked Mr. Wood to remove the 'sleeping' cabin in the area from our
land." (R. 44)
In none of the conversations did the Stratfords claim
the area between the Gudgell and Wilkins survey lines.
Apparently the first time the Stratfords saw the sleeping
cabin they complained that it was on their land. They
then laid no clai1n to the area south of the Wilkins line.
The conclusion seems obvious that the line established
by the surveyor whom Mrs. Stratford testified surveyed
the land for them 25 or 30 years ago was approximately
the sarne line that Mr. vVilkins found when he surveyed
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for the Stratfords for they apparently considered the line
to be approximately there.
The foregoing facts appellants were not permitted
to argue. These facts should hardly be clearly in the
minds of the jurors because all of the evidence on the
foregoing nmtters had gone in piecemeal and the jury
eould not be expected to appreciate the significance of
the evidence unless it was argued to them.
Furthermore, in denying appellants the right to
argue this all iluportant part of their case, the Court
in effect told the jury they could not consider such evidence.
The effect of an erroneous ruling on the matter of
permitting Counsel to argue evidence to the jury was
considered in the case of Givans v. Chi. St. P. M. & 0. Ry.
Co., 56 N.W. (2d) 300, ______ Minn ....... , 38 A.L.R. 1393. In
that case the Court said :
"Where at the opening of a court's charge the
jurors were told by the court that arguments of
counsel are unnecessary and need not be given, the
fundan1ental i1nportance of such arguments is
thereby so minimized in the minds of the jurors
that the resulting prejudice and error cannot
reasonably be cured by belatedly permitting arguments to be made at the close of the charge. Under
the circumstances here existing the making of an
argument at the close of the charge would have
appeared to the jurors as an unimportant and unwarranted encroachment upon their time and as
being permitted only with the reluctant consent
of the judge to whom they looked for guidance."'
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The statement of this Court 1n Jo-seph v. W. H.
Groves L.D.S. Hospital, 318 P.(2d) 330, 7 Utah (2d) 39,
applies in this case :
"This emphasizes the importance of according plaintiff's counsel the opportunity of performing one of his essential functions, that of arguing
his case to the jury. In doing so, he should be permitted to refer to and use all of the competent
evidence he has marshalled and presented in the
trial and to explain its meaning and argue its
signifinance to a client's cause.
"Some indication of the importance of the
error with which we are here concerned is to be
found in the fact that counsel thought the matter
of sufficient consequence that he objected to the
reading and use of the evidence in the argument
to the jury. It strikes the writer as being somewhat inconsistent that Counsel now urges that
depriving plaintiff of the use of such evidence is
merely harmless error. If it is so plain that it
would not have helped plaintiff's case, one is lead
to wonder why counsel made the objection and
insisted that it not be used. The obvious answer
seems to be that defendant's counsel was actually
apprehensive that it may have a substantial effect
against his client. Of course, he could not be sure,
nor can we.
"In view of the fact that there is such substantial doubt that we cannot, with any degree of
assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence
would not have been helpful to plaintiff, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of allowing him to
have a full and fair presentation of his cause to
the jury."
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1n the

ca~e

at bar (;ounsel for plaintiff objected to
Counsel arguing the foregoing facts, and the
{•ourt ~ustained the objection in the presence of the jury.
appt>llant~·

In 88 C.J.S., page 330, Section 165, it is said:
"\Vhere tht>re is an issue in the case to be submitted to the jury, and he is not in default, a party
litigant has a right to have his case fully and
fairly argued to the jury, even though facts may
appear plain to the court."
The other evidence in this n1atter on the most iinportant issue in the case of the correct location of the
boundary line would not preponderate in favor of either
side to any great degree, and the argument which defendants' ·Counsel was not permitted to make was, therefore, of great iinportance to appellants, and constituted
serious prejudicial error.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE WITNESS
COON, OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL, TO STATE
HIS OPINION THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS INCORRECT. (R.l14)

When witness Coon started to testify that he had
cheeked Gudgell's procedures, Counsel for Appellants
objected that his evidence was not rebuttal. The Court
sustained the objection as to anything Gudgell had done,
but stated he would pennit Coon to testify to anything he
checked on Wilkins. (R. 110-111) .Coon was asked the
following questions and gave the following answers:
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Q. "Have you made any independent check of
procedures made by or taken by Mr. Wilkins 1
Do you know what procedures he followed~"
A.

"No. The only thing I had was a copy of a
map that he had drawn of that area, but I
have never talked with l\fr. Wilkins, and anything that I have concerning his procedures
or methods of calculations would be strictly
hearsay."

Q. "Based upon your own calculation of the location of that corner, is it your opinion that
the Wilkins' location of that corner is correct
or incorrect~"
To this question Counsel objected that the question was
leading, suggestive and calling for a conclusion which
was not the province of the witness, but the province of
the jury. The objection was overruled. (R. 113)
The witness did not directly answer the question, but
subsequently was asked the following question:
"And in your opinion of the two surveys, your
professional opinion would he that the Wilkins'
survey is incorrect f'
To this Counsel made the same objection as heretofore
stated. The Court then stated:
"Well, he may answer as to whether in his
opinion the Wilkins' survey is incorrect."
Witness then rnade the following answer:
"Yes, our survey would indicate that the
Wilkins' survey is incorrect." (R. 114)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
lt will be noted that thi~ opinion "that the Wilkins' survey is incorrect," is an opinion on the credibility of the
testimony of Mr. Wilkins.
Counsel is aware of the position of this Court on the
matter of adrnissibility of opinion evidence on the rnatter
directly before the jury to decide. This Court has followed the reasoning of Wigrnore and :McCormick. We submit
the following statement frorn III cCormick on Evidence,
pages 25-26, as applicable to the n1atter now before this
Court:
"Undoubtedly there is a kind of statement by
the witness which arnounts to little more than an
expression of his belief as to how the case should
be decided, or as to the arnount of damages which
should be given, or as to the credibiUy of certa~n
testimony. Such extreme expressions as these all
courts, it is believed, would exclude. There is no
necessity for such evidence and to receive it would
tend to suggest that the judge and jury may shift
responsibility for decision to the witness ....
''The opposite view (the view that expert
testimony is always adrnissible even though it
directly bears upon the ultimate issue) would entirely discard the rule that mere coincidence with
an ultimate issue is a ground for exclusion of a
witness's opinion or conclusion. It is doubtful
if any court has found it expedient to go so far,
but this is the view of Wigmore, and is the one
embodied in the unifonn rules. Probably Wigmore
would have conceded that the extreme instances
rnentioned above of opinions as to how the case
should be decided and the like should be excluded
as impolitic and superfluous and there is real
doubt that a judge trained in the common law
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tradition in a state which has adopted the uniform
rules would exclude such opinions under Rule 45,
on the ground that their value is outweighed by a
'substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confused issues or of misleading the jury.' "
POINT THREE
THE .COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.
THIRTEEN AND EACH SUBDIVISION THEREOF.

Counsel took exception to Instruction No. 13, which
in substance stated as follows:
" (a)

That plain tiffs are entitled to recover an
amount representing reasonable rental
value of the property used by defendants;

" (b) . The reasonable cost of removing structures
built upon the land less the salvage value
thereof; and
" (c)

One-half of the cost of making a survey of
the land."

As to the first portion of the Instruction, objection
was made upon the ground that the only evidence in the
case was to the effect that such property had no rental
value. Plaintiffs' only witness to this matter, Mr. Holt,
stated in answer to a statement frmn the Court:

Q.

"I suppose these sites up there are of use to
the public generally only when a cabin is built
on them."

A.

"Yes." (R.44)

The Court then offered to change the Instruction to
provide only that the damages should be assessed one-
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half of the Wilkins' survey cost if the vVilkins survey is
adopted, or one-half of the Gudgell survey, if the Gudgell
survey is adopted. (R.143) However, the Court did not
change the Instruction.
The ·Court also 1nade the observation that since the
building is worth the amount of removal of it, that the
second portion of the question might be taken from the
jury. (R. 143) This leaves only the third portion of the
question, which the Court would not concede, was erroneous. The third portion was the awarding of one-half
of the cost incurred in making a surven.
Based on this Instruction the jury found in favor of
plaintiffs for the amount of $295.00.
As stated in 15 C.J. 124, Sections 271-2:
"According to the weight of authority the expense of procuring surveys, maps, plats or plans
is not taxable as costs unless there is a clear statutory authority therefor."
We do not have any statutory authority for assessing
survey expenses as costs.
The case of We.Vss v. Meyer, 32 P. 1025, 24 Ore. 108,
is in point. In this case the Court stated:
"Was there error of the trial court in refusing
to allow an iten1 of $75.00 claimed to have been
paid by the defendant for surveying and making
a plat of the ground in controversy. We are clearly of the opinion that this item was no more necessary as a 'disbursement' than clerical services in
the preparation of the pleadings or the board and
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expenses of himself or counsel while attending the
trial or any other expense incident to a trial and
for which the law does not contemplate there
should be a charge against the adverse party~"
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the judgment upon the verdict
of the jury appealed from should be reversed, and a new
trial ordered, and appellants awarded their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
~10FFAT,

IVERSON AND ELGGREN

1311 Walker Bank Building,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants.
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